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PROJECT FINANCE INVESTORS: SOLUTION TO POPULISMO 
 
Jenny Small* 
 
 
 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
"I saw other people wrapped in flames jump from the plane. I was in 
seat number 21, a window seat at wing level. The doors would not open, 
so I jumped through a hole in the plane amid the flames from a height of 
about two yards. ... I don't know how I survived."1 This vivid description 
came from a witness’s account of the 1998 Cuban airplane crash in 
Quito, Ecuador.2 After takeoff, the airplane’s engines stalled due to the 
high elevation, making the airplane unable to receive enough lift to clear 
the surrounding mountains and volcanoes.3 The plane spiraled 
downwards and eventually crashed into a nearby soccer field where 
young children were playing.4 The plane exploded leaving few 
survivors.5  
This crash and many others occurred at the old Mariscal Sucre airport 
in Quito, Ecuador.6 The severely dangerous conditions of that airport 
compelled the city to relocate the airport.7 The new Mariscal Sucre 
airport began operating in February of 2013,8 providing the city and the 
nation with hopes beyond avoiding safety problems. Indeed, they also 
hoped it would solve the country’s crippling poverty9 and moribund 
economy.10 While Ecuador has a vast amount of natural resources, forty 
percent of the country’s population suffers from poverty to the point that 
they are barely surviving. This high level of poverty shows that a 
nation’s potential has little value without a supporting infrastructure.11  
                                                
* J.D. Boston University School of Law, 2013.  
1 Dozens Dead in Ecuador Crash, BBC (Aug. 30, 1998), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/161030.stm. 
2 Id.  
3 77 Die in Crash of Cuban Jet in Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/30/world/77-die-in-crash-of-cuban-jet-in-ecuador.html. 
4 Dozens Dead in Ecuador Crash, supra note 1. 
5 Id.  
6 Gonzalo Solano, Mariscal Sucre, Quito’s Airport, to be Moved Feb. 19 (Photos), 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 30, 2013, 2:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/30/mariscal-
sucre-quitos-air_n_2582582.html. 
7 See Joe Bates, New Era for Quito: $700 Million Airport Set to Open, AIRPORT WORLD (Oct. 
25, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.airport-world.com/item/2006-new-era-for-quito.  
8 See id. 
9 See Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador’s Poverty Rate Fell to 28.6% in 2011 vs. 32.8% in 2010, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2012, 1:38 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120117-712857.html. 
10 Nathan Gill, Ecuador Economic Growth Stagnates as Oil Drop Cuts Spending, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 9, 2013, 3:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-09/ecuador-economic-growth-
stagnates-as-oil-drop-cuts-spending-1-.html.  
11 See generally Ecuador es un imán para las inversiones también, TELÉGRAFO (Apr. 1, 2013),  
http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/economia/item/ecuador-es-un-iman-para-las-inversiones-tambien.html. 
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The new airport became the first step towards addressing the gap 
between Ecuador’s potential and its struggling infrastructure.12 The 
airport seeks to connect Ecuador to world markets and provide a catalyst 
for further investment in domestic infrastructure.13 Nonetheless, the vast 
resources, new airport, and other supporting infrastructure are not fully 
utilized because foreign investors perceive the risk of Ecuador’s 
populism as outweighing any potential gains.14 
Populism is a significant political risk for entrepreneurs in Ecuador. 
However, entrepreneurs can mitigate the risks of populism through 
project finance, learning from the experiences of the new airport in Quito 
(Quiport), and adopting a strong stabilization clause.15 This paper first 
describes the largely unexploited opportunity for investment in 
Ecuador.16 These unexploited opportunities include the abundant natural 
resources extending from the coast of Esmeraldas to the interior 
Amazon.17 Although the government provides incentives for developing 
these resources, many investors have not heeded the call.18  
Investor neglect of Ecuador, as Part III will explain, derives from a 
fear of populism.19 Populism is a growing trend under the leadership of 
the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, who has shown a commitment 
to redistributing wealth, enacting laws that exploit foreign companies, 
and challenging a perceived global power imbalance.20 Correa’s actions, 
such as his 2010 decree that foreign oil companies must promote state 
policies and submit at least seventy percent of their revenues to the 
state,21 have become a calculated risk for investors in Ecuador.22  
Investors, however, should not allow such risk to entirely deter 
them.23 They can reconcile the potential benefits of investment with the 
risks associated with populism by using project finance.24 Part IV 
describes how use of project finance can allocate risk and utilize 
                                                
12 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
13 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
14 See generally Andres Oppenheimer, Latin America’s Fastest-Growing Economies of 2013, 
MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/24/3362939/andres-
oppenheimer-latin-americas.html; see also James McKeigue, Ecuador: Is it Nuts to Invest Here?, 
MONEYWEEK (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.moneyweek.com/investments/stock-markets/emerging-
markets/new-world-why-you-should-be-getting-excited-about-ecuador-62904. 
15 See discussion infra Parts III–VI. 
16 See discussion infra Part II.  
17 See discussion infra Part II. 
18 See discussion infra Part II. 
19 See discussion infra Part III. 
20 See discussion infra Part III. 
21 See Jason Pierce, Note, A South American Energy Treaty: How the Region Might Attract 
Foreign Investment in a Wake of Resource Nationalism, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 417, 431 (2011); see 
also Ecuador: Correa’s Play for Greater Influence in the Oil Sector, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2010, 4:20 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2010/04/21/ecuador-correas-play-for-greater-
influence-in-the-oil-sector/. 
22 See Sara Schaefer Muňoz & Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador’s Correa Poised to Broaden his 
Sway, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2013, 6:40 PM),http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873244 
32004578304611096042632.html; but see Sara Miller Llana, Ecuador’s Populist Leader Still 
Strong, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 26, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/ 
2009/0426/p06s07-woam.html (explaining that “Correa is more difficult to categorize”). 
23 See generally discussion infra Part IV. 
24 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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expected cash flows to fund a venture, which allows the project to 
sustain itself on its merits.25 Part V demonstrates the merits of project 
finance in Ecuador by exemplifying the Quiport project.26 The project 
addressed a need, furthered the nation’s goals, and overcame a 
manifestation of populism through a constitutional challenge.27 Finally, 
Part VI offers the specific recommendation, based on the Quiport project, 
that project financiers should employ stabilization clauses.28 
 
II.  OPPORTUNITY FOR INVESTMENT: ECUADOR’S RESOURCES 
 
Ecuador is located at the equator and boasts a beautiful coastline, 
mountains, and a sliver of the Amazon rainforest. The country possesses 
a myriad of resources, some of which the world has not yet even 
discovered and many that have not reached their full potential.29 For 
instance, Ecuador’s cloud forests possess trees that bleed when cut.30 
This blood-like sap can heal wounds, and possibly even prevent the 
growth of cancer.31 The first investor to capitalize on Ecuador’s 
incredible resources stands to gain large financial benefits from such an 
investment.32 For Ecuador, the resources present an opportunity to evolve 
in a globalized economy.33 Nonetheless, Ecuador lacks the ability to 
make this kind of economic progression because neither the government 
nor foreign investors have made the needed investment in the country’s 
infrastructure.34    
To support a resource driven economy in the future, Ecuador must 
have sustainability and diversification of its resources.35 First, Ecuador 
must sustain its economy by preserving its primary export—oil.36 The 
nation currently produces only a small portion of its oil,37 even though it 
has the “third-largest oil reserves in South America after Venezuela and 
                                                
25 See discussion infra Part IV. 
26 See discussion infra Part V. 
27 See discussion infra Part V. 
28 See discussion infra Part VI. 
29 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2012 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT- ECUADOR 
(2012). 
30 Chris Kilham, Dragon’s Blood for Skin Issues, FOX NEWS LATINO (May 1, 2011), 
http://latino.foxnews.mobi/quickPage.html?page=30422&content=51372751&pageNum=-1; see 
generally Manuel Sandoval et al., Sangre de Grado Croton Palanostigma Induces Apoptosis in 
Human Gastrointestinal Cancer Cells, 80 J. ETHNO-PHARMACOLOGY 121 (2002).  
31 Kilham, supra note 30; see generally Sandoval, supra note 30.  
32 See Clive Cookson, How to Make the Most of ‘Wild Wealth’, FT MAG. (Mar. 29, 2013, 6:21 
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/168acd56-967a-11e2-
9ab200144feabdc0.html#axzz2RiwUe7IU. 
33 See generally Pierce, supra note 21, at 417–18. 
34 See supra notes 56–11 and accompanying text. 
35 Fander Falconi, Ecuador Begins to Roar, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2013, 1:15 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/07/ecuador-begins-to-roar; see also John Vidal, 
Oil: Can Ecuador See Past the Black Stuff?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2010, 6:18 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2010/sep/28/ecuador-oil-extraction-
amazon-yasuni; see generally Analia Murias, First Concession Granted for Mariculture, FIS (Apr. 
9, 2013, 11:40 PM), http://www.fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?l=e&country=0&special= 
&monthyear=&day=&id=60014&ndb=1&df=0. 
36 See generally Vidal, supra note 35. 
37 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ECUADOR: BACKGROUND (2012); see also Vidal, supra note 35. 
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Brazil.”38 While oil is an important resource to Ecuador’s economy,39 it 
has become Ecuador’s “resource curse,” impairing the rest of the 
economy as a result of Ecuador’s over reliance on it.40 To regenerate the 
economy, Ecuador joined with the United Nations to begin the Yasuní-
ITT development initiative in 2007 to reduce its oil exploitation, 
especially in biologically diverse areas like the Amazon.41 As of March 
2013, participants have contributed USD $64 million and pledged USD 
$187 million.42   
Second, besides rationing its oil, Ecuador must continue to focus on 
its other industries.43 For instance, Ecuador has marketed its traditional 
exports of coffee, chocolate, and bananas, for which it became 
synonymous with the label of “banana republic” for so many years.44 In 
addition, according to a March 2012 draft document, Ecuador estimated 
that agriculture would continue to economically provide for its rural 
population.45 Agricultural exports are particularly significant to Ecuador 
because of the nation’s geostrategic location near major markets like the 
United States.46 With such proximity, Ecuador is highly competitive 
against other exporters because even if other nations can match its cheap 
labor, Ecuador’s transportation costs are often lower.47 
Finally, Ecuador must develop new marketable resources to sustain 
its economy.48 In characterizing this prong of its development, Ecuador’s 
National Secretary of Planning and Development declared that they 
planned to reduce their reliance on “neoliberal recipes of privatisation” in 
favor of their “innovative financial models to overcome the threat of 
crises; and in new conceptions of good living, based on social and 
environmental sustainability.”49 The Secretary remains vague, however, 
                                                
38 Update 1-Ecuador Oil Output Up 0.8 Percent in 2012, Under Target, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 
2013, 12:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/11/ecuador-oil-
idUSL1E9CB49M20130111; Ecuador Facts and Figures, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXP. 
COUNTRIES, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/148.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2013); U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 37.  
39 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 29 (describing oil as one of Ecuador’s “strategic sectors”). 
40 Vidal, supra note 35. 
41 John Vidal, Project to Leave Oil in Ground Under Yasuní Park Reaches $300M, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 23, 2012, 5:37 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/nov/23/yasuni-oil-
ground-project. 
42 Id. 
43 See generally Oficina de Evaluación Independiente, República del Ecuador: Evaluación del 
Programa en el País 4 (June 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Fondo Internacional de 
Desarrollo Agrícola). 
44 Id.; but see John SanBrailo, Ecuador: Never a Banana Republic, LATIN BUS. CHRON. (May 
29, 2012), http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=5689. 
45 Oficina de Evaluación Independiente, supra note 43.  
46 Carlos E. Ludena & Sara Wong, Presentation at the Ninth Annual Conference on Global 
Economic Analysis, Domestic Support Policies for Agriculture in Ecuador and the U.S.-Andean 
Countries Free Trade Agreement: An Applied General Equilibrium Assessment 4 (June 2006), 
available at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2580.pdf. 
47 See generally MICHAEL REID, FORGOTTEN CONTINENT: THE BATTLE FOR LATIN AMERICA’S 
SOUL 301 (2007). 
48 Diversificar la economía de Ecuador es el nuevo desafío del reelecto de Ecuador, AMÉRICA 
ECONOMIA (Feb. 18, 2013, 6:47 PM), http://www.americaeconomia.com/economia-
mercados/finanzas/diversificar-la-economia-el-nuevo-desafio-del-reelecto-correa. 
49 Falconi, supra note 35. 
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as to the nature of other financial models.50 While the approach attempts 
to further pursue wealth redistribution strategies,51 Ecuador has at least 
shown some signs that it would like to attract foreign investment to 
cultivate other industries.52 For example, in March 2013, Ecuador 
promulgated a four-year plan to attract foreign direct investment with the 
hope of increasing foreign investment by fifteen to twenty percent.53 In 
the plan, Ecuador identifies the main sectors for investment as tourism, 
metal fabrication, petroleum, pharmacy, renewable energy, applied 
software, and agriculture.54 As a result of the plan and other conditions, 
the United States Department of State has reported that Ecuador is 
“relatively open to foreign investment in most sectors.”55  
Despite the competitive resources and intent to diversify, Ecuador and 
other Latin American nations generally lack the infrastructure they need 
to exploit and market these resources.56 While Latin America hosts about 
twenty bids for USD $31.6 billion in infrastructure projects,57 the 
International Project Finance Association estimates that the region still 
needs USD $800 billion worth of investment within five years to foster 
its infrastructure.58 Due to this, neither the governments nor private 
parties have invested in the infrastructure necessary to support resource 
development.59  
This problem is common amongst many Latin American 
governments.60 While Ecuador and other Latin governments provide 
enticing investments, private investors have generally failed to contribute 
to the Latin American infrastructure.61 The world has focused on 
development in other regions like Africa and it has largely overlooked 
Latin America, despite its copious resources.62 At a Council on Foreign 
Relations discussion in November 2012, panelists lamented the world’s 
                                                
50 See id. 
51 Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa Says Citizens Will be in Charge, Not Money, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 18, 2013, 6:10 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/18/ecuador-president-
heralds-citizen-revolution. 
52 See generally Ecuador es un imán para las inversiones también, supra note 11. 
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 29.  
56 U.N. ECON. COMMISSION FOR LATIN AM. AND THE CARIBBEAN, The Economic 
Infrastructure Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean, 293 BULLETIN FAL 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.cepal.org/usi/noticias/bolfall/6/42926/FAL-293-WEB-ENG-2.pdf; see also Pierce, supra 
note 21, at 418. 
57 Infrastructure Bids in Latin America, LATIN BUS. CHRON. (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=5786. 
58 IPFA UK: London: The Latin America Infrastructure Market, INT’L PROJECT FIN. ASS’N, 
http://www.ipfa.org/events/6792/ipfa-uk-london-the-latin-america-infrastructure-market (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2013); see also Bates, supra note 7. 
59 See Pierce, supra note 21, at 418.  
60 See Krista Hughes & Lomi Kriel, Latin America Taps Private Sector for Infrastructure 
Needs, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 17, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-17/news/sns-rt-
iadbinfrastructurel1n0c9003-20130317_1_private-sector-infrastructure-iadb. 
61 Gillian White, Booming Latin America Being Ignored, Experts Say, MARKET WATCH (Nov. 
19, 2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-11-19/investing/35250233_1_van-agtmael-
economic-outlook-latin-america. 
62 REID, supra note 47, at 1 (“Scarcely a month goes by without some political leader or aging 
rock star urging the citizens of the world’s richer countries to do something to aid Africa .... But 
what of Latin America, the other great region of the developing world?”). 
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“benign neglect” of market opportunities in Latin America.63 
Recognizing this “neglect,” the World Bank stated that Latin America 
has slower development than other comparable areas.64 Moreover, 
foreign direct investment in Latin America is significantly less than 
foreign direct investment in Asia.65 In fact, in 2012, foreign direct 
investment in Ecuador actually decreased.66 The scarcity of investment 
has required Ecuador to stray from its strategic economic goals and 
entertain its only potential suitor, China, with its demands for oil.67 Thus, 
like many other Latin American countries, Ecuador only has the 
resources to support its economy if it can attract investors to develop the 
needed infrastructure.  
 
III.  CHALLENGES WITH INVESTING IN ECUADOR: POPULISM 
 
Although Ecuador’s rich resources are appealing, investors fear that 
the appeal is nothing but a siren’s call because of the populism risks that 
could potentially negate any benefit.68 Recognizing such risks, 
Moneyweek reporter, James McKeigue, claims that investors “would 
have to be nuts to invest in Ecuador.”69 He states that the resulting 
populism from Correa’s “citizens’ revolution” is a major reason to forego 
investment.70 His concern, shared by others, is that populism can lead to 
the nationalization of businesses and industries as well as changes in 
national laws that adversely affect businesses.71 The basis for his fear is 
the growing trend of populism in South America.72 In Ecuador, Correa 
has embarked on a citizens’ revolution that is similar to other populist 
nations in the region, adjusted the domestic power balance, and 
attempted to threaten the global status quo.73 
                                                
63 White, supra note 61; see also REID, supra note 47, at 4. 
64 Infrastructure in Latin America & the Caribbean: Recent Developments and Key 
Challenges, WORLD BANK (Aug. 31, 2005), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
COUNTRIES/LACEXT/0,,contentMDK:20631899~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:2585
54,00.html. 
65 World Investment Report 2012: Towards a Generation of Investment Policies, UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (June 2012), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012overview_en.pdf. 
66 La inversión extranjera en Ecuador baja 36,4%, EL UNIVERSO (July 25, 2012), 
http://www.eluniverso.com/2012/07/25/1/1356/inversion-extranjera-ecuador-baja-364.html. 
67 Eduardo Garcia & Charlie Zhu, China’s CNP in Talks with Ecuador Over $12.5 Billion 
Refinery, REUTERS (July 20, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/20/us-ecuador-
refinery-cnpc-idINBRE86J08C20120720; see Jonathan Kaiman, Ecuador Auctions Off Amazon to 
Chinese Oil Firms, GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2013, 1:16 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/26/ecuador-chinese-oil-bids-amazon. 
68 See LaKindra Mohr, Of Note: Is the Populist Left in Latin America Bad for Business in the 
Region?, 27 SAIS REV. 17, 17–19 (2007); see also Robert Looney, Morales Walks the Populist High 
Wire, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/26/morales_ 
walks_the_populist_high_wire; see also Pierce, supra note 21, at 423. 
69 McKeigue, supra note 14. 
70 Id.  
71 Id.; see also Pierce, supra note 21, at 431. 
72 See The Return of Populism, ECONOMIST (Apr. 12, 2006), 
http://www.economist.com/node/6802448. 
73 See generally Pierce, supra note 21, at 424; Gabriela Molina & Gonzalo Solano, Ecuador’s 
Triumphant Correa Vows to Deepen ‘Citizen’s Revolution’ Following Landslide, NBC NEWS (Feb. 
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Ecuador’s citizens’ revolution is only one instance of populism 
festering in Latin America.74 Latin America’s vision of populism, first 
articulated by former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez,75 revives an 
1800s dream of South American nations joining together to restore the 
global power balance.76 Chavez, in particular, envisioned a return to 
Gran Colombia to empower the South American peoples to challenge the 
world elite.77 The nation of Gran Colombia consisted of what is now 
Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Colombia, and parts of Brazil and Peru. 
Gran Colombia was a nation that lasted only a few years, but continues 
to endure in the hearts of its disciples.78 This vision is a form of 
populism. Generally, populism is manifested as the will of the people 
against a state government.79 In South America, populism is manifested 
as the will of the people against world powers.80 More recently this has 
become known as Chavismo81 and is part of the Bolivarian Revolution.82  
Ecuador has become a cosponsor of Chavez’s vision.83 In 2006, the 
people of Ecuador elected Correa as president and have reelected him 
twice since.84 His prior role as a finance minister and reputation as an 
economist contributed to the people’s perception that he was an outsider 
to political corruption.85 Moreover, his promises of “participatory 
democracy” enamored the people of Ecuador.86 His ascent brought 
stability to Ecuador, after more than a decade in which every elected 
president had succumbed to political challenges and prematurely 
                                                                                                         
18, 2013, 9:33 AM), http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/18/17002500-ecuadors-
triumphant-correa-vows-to-deepen-citizens-revolution-following-landslide?lit. 
74 Molina & Solano, supra note 73; see generally The Return of Populism, supra note 72.  
75 Doug Bandow, With Hugo Chavez Dead, Will Chavismo Also Die?, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2013, 
8:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2013/03/07/with-hugo-chavez-dead-will-
chavismo-also-die/. 
76 See Franklin Foer, The Talented Mr. Chávez, ATLANTIC (May 1, 2006, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-talented-mr-ch-
vez/304809/?single_page=true. 
77 Id.  
78 See generally Matthew Brown, Not Forging Nations, but Foraging for them: Uncertain 
Collective Identities in Gran Colombia, 12 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 223, 226 (2006); see also 
REID, supra note 47, at 64. 
79 See The Return of Populism, supra note 72; see also REID, supra note 47, at 160, 279. 
80 See REID, supra note 47, at 160, 279 (“Chavez himself claims that his ‘Bolivarian 
revolution’ is continental in scope.”). 
81 See Hugo Chavez’s Rotten Legacy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573106-appeal-populist-autocracy-has-been-weakened-
not-extinguished-hugo-ch%C3%A1vezs-rotten. 
82 Frank M. Walsh, The Legal Death of the Latin American Democracy: Bolivarian Populism’s 
Model for Centralizing Power, Eliminating Political Opposition, and Undermining the Rule of Law, 
16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 241, 244 (2010) (“Hugo Chávez refers to his political philosophy as the 
Bolivarian Revolution. The movement repackages populism.”); see also Walter Molano, Latin 
America, Its Emerging Markets and the Global, 6 J. INT’L. BUS. & L. 51, 53 (2007). 
83 CARLOS DE LA TORRE, POPULIST SEDUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ECUADORIAN 
EXPERIENCE 175 (2010) (describing President Correa as “the embodiment of the citizens’ 
revolution.”). 
84 Id. at 174. 
85 Id. at 177–79. 
86 Id. at 174; see also William Neuman, President Correa Handily Wins Re-election in 
Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/world/americas/rafael-
correa-wins-re-election-in-ecuador.html. 
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terminated their tenure.87 Prior to Correa, Ecuador had a reputation as a 
rather unstable nation with “the average life of Ecuador’s constitution ... 
[being] just ten years ... [and] the average president [lasting] in office no 
more than two years.”88 Correa has reinvented Ecuador’s reputation in a 
new light as a stable nation that embraces populism.89  
 Correa has done a number of things to establish populism in Ecuador. 
In a nation where much of the population (roughly forty percent) lives in 
poverty, Correa’s policies of public spending have empowered him.90 He 
has reduced the poverty level by about five percent since 2007 by taking 
a larger share of the wealthiest ten percent’s income.91 Correa also 
employed a prototypical populist tool by enacting a law that appropriated 
seventy percent of the nation’s oil income in 2010 for government use.92 
By the end of the discussions between the government and the 
companies, Ecuador’s government had laid claim to nearly eighty 
percent of the oil revenues.93 The law also allowed the government to 
fully nationalize the oil industry if any private company violated 
Ecuador’s domestic laws.94 For example, the government recently 
enacted a law that requires all companies to promote Ecuador’s 
governmental policies.95 Correa enacted this law without legislative 
review, thereby demonstrating a disregard for domestic opposition.96 To 
justify his actions, Correa’s government claimed that investors had 
breached their contracts.97 Similarly, Correa has targeted landholders 
with the promise to redistribute “idle” land to the poor.98 Such policies 
will likely adversely affect the very banana industry that has been a pillar 
to Ecuador’s economy.99  
Emboldened by his domestic experience, Correa further developed 
populism in Ecuador when he signaled his capacity to directly confront 
                                                
87 In depth Ecuador: A Recent History of Ecuador, CBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2005) (on file with 
author); see also Arthur Brice, Ecuador’s Correa Claims Re-election Win, CNN (Apr. 27, 2009), 
9:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/04/26/ecuador.election/; DE LA TORRE, 
supra note 83, at 177 (“Ecuador has become synonymous with political instability.”). 
88 REID, supra note 47, at 24. 
89 Pierce, supra note 21, at 430 (“Furthermore, the Ecuadorian climate for foreign investment 
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world powers.100 In 2012, he demonstrated his willingness to challenge 
the status quo at a global level.101 The opportunity arose when WikiLeak 
creator, Julian Assange, absconded from Sweden after receiving charges 
of rape and sexual assault.102 Assange also faced potential prosecution in 
the United States for conspiracy to release classified information.103 In 
England, Assange would have faced extradition to Sweden, but Ecuador 
offered him asylum in its embassy.104 This asylum may not signify any 
real shift in the global political balance, but it does reveal Ecuador’s 
willingness to confront other governments even on petty matters.105  
Correa has also demonstrated populism by distancing Ecuador and its 
resources from traditional international investment enforcement 
mechanisms.106 Correa blames much of Ecuador’s dismal economy on 
the trade and development policies of international financial institutions 
and has begun to eschew the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund.107 His efforts to liberate Ecuador include withdrawal from the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
and from bilateral investment treaties (BIT).108 Ecuador acted upon a 
breadth of criticism that the international frameworks for resolving 
disputes disproportionately favor investors over the emerging nations.109 
Even if the criticism is valid, Ecuador did a disservice to itself and its 
people. At a time when Ecuador hopes to diversify its economy, its 
actions are likely to alienate the very investors it needs.110  
Correa’s actions only serve to magnify investors’ fears of 
expropriation, nationalization, and other ex-post contractual 
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renegotiations that often occur in populist nations.111 Investors worry that 
they will spend their money to develop a resource only to be told by 
Ecuador that they cannot benefit from their investment.112 Investors have 
witnessed such tactics113 across Latin America.114 Without the traditional 
international investment protections,115 investors may find the risks of 
populism surpass any potential benefits of investing in Ecuador.116   
 
IV.  INVESTORS’ SOLUTION TO POPULISM: PROJECT FINANCE 
 
Despite the disappointing political reality for investors in Ecuador, 
individuals can still make profitable investments by using project 
finance.117 Project finance can help investors mitigate political risks, 
realize the benefits of investment, and align their interests with 
Ecuador’s long-term goals.118 Because project finance is dependent on 
the projects’ cash flow without recourse to financial contributors, 
investors can pursue projects based on the projects’ merits without the 
risks of populism overshadowing the benefits.119  
Although project finance has existed since the early days of the 
Roman Empire, it has become a significant financial model for major, 
long-term infrastructure projects.120 A recent example of project 
financing was the construction of the Eurotunnel connecting London and 
Paris.121 The Eurotunnel, also known as the Chunnel, is a railway under 
the English Channel that innovators imagined in the 1800s, long before 
the necessary technology existed.122 The sponsors adopted project 
financing with a concession agreement and a set of contracts.123 Despite 
problems such as underestimated costs and the need to restructure the 
concession agreement because of delays, the project was a success.124 
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The Eurotunnel project demonstrates how investors can capitalize on 
their dreams using project finance.125     
The two major benefits of project finance are the use of cash flows 
and the distribution of risk.126 Project finance allows various sponsors to 
advance a project based on the expected cash flows of the project as the 
return on the investment.127 In other words, “project financing is lending 
based ‘on the merits of a project rather than the credit of the project 
sponsor.’”128 Structurally, project finance involves an independent 
company, or special project vehicle, that exists for only the term of the 
project.129 Through this vehicle, sponsors arrange for contributions of 
equity and borrow money with the promise of cash flows from the 
project.130 Lenders generally have no recourse against any particular 
company because, as explained above, their return is based on the 
expected cash flow of the project, not a particular company.131 Sponsors 
that contribute a large portion of the equity will see a return on their 
investment when the project begins to realize profits.132 In contrast, when 
using corporate finance, usually the original company is entirely 
responsible for funding the project.133  
Using cash flows from the project benefits the financiers in various 
ways.134 For instance, cash flows incentivize management to behave 
efficiently in order to seize profits from the project.135 Moreover, project 
finance’s use of cash flows as the return on investment reduces the risk 
that the borrower might default strategically because the cash flows are 
“verifiable” and all creditors can monitor them.136 In contrast, should the 
borrower attempt to default on the money it owes lenders under a 
corporate finance model, the lenders’ primary option is typically to 
foreclose on any security interest it may have.137 Simply put, project 
finance lenders do not depend on the borrower for the money, but rather, 
they depend on the project and its success.138  
Project financing distributes the risks among the participants.139 Most 
infrastructure projects carry substantial risks given the duration of the 
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project, the need to collaborate with host governments, and the 
accompanying political environments.140 Project finance contracts allow 
parties to determine which party will cover certain risks and creates 
assurances just in case one or more parties fail to complete specific 
aspects of the project.141 For example, many project finance contracts 
contain force majeure clauses to mitigate the costs of unforeseen 
disasters.142 Accordingly, the incentives of expected cash flows and the 
risk shifting mechanism of project financing would be particularly 
valuable for handling a project in Ecuador where risks are amplified by 
populism.143  
 
V. EXAMPLE OF PROJECT FINANCE IN ECUADOR: QUIPORT 
 
The Quiport project demonstrates how project finance can resolve 
investment difficulties in populist nations like Ecuador. Quiport involved 
construction of a new airport and the infrastructure to alleviate safety and 
business concerns caused by the old airport in Quito, Ecuador.144 
 
A. Benefits & Goals 
 
A new airport was not just another infrastructure project for Quito, 
but rather, it was a response to a dangerous situation and an opportunity 
to open up the country to world markets.145 By accepting the need for a 
new airport, the nation also dared to dream, envisioning the new airport 
as part of its greater development ambitions.146 With access to more 
locations and better infrastructure, Ecuador could support global cargo 
and become a regional hub.147  
Part of Ecuador’s vision for a new airport was to fix the defects of the 
old airport, including its safety and business issues.148 The old airport’s 
location was dangerous.149 The airport was built at a high elevation and 
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had a short landing strip situated between mountains and volcanoes.150 If 
an airplane missed the precariously placed runway, the pilot would have 
to then quickly maneuver to avoid the mountains. 151 At such a high 
elevation, the thin air could cause the engines to stall and the wings to 
receive minimal lift.152 To make matters worse, Quito’s buildings were 
just a few feet away from the airport’s runway.153 As a result of these 
issues, the airport suffered at least ten “serious accidents” since its 
opening in 1960.154 Additionally, these issues made travel to or from 
Quito cumbersome and inconvenient.155 For instance, many airlines had 
to fly through Guayaquil, Ecuador to refuel, which created additional 
costs and delays in travel.156  
The new airport not only addressed safety concerns, but it also 
supported Ecuador’s ambitions to become a “regional hub” by enabling 
access to more destinations.157  For example, with the new airport built at 
an elevation of 7,000 feet instead of 9,000 feet, airplanes can now carry 
enough fuel to travel greater distances.158 The new runway is more 
expansive than the last, which allows larger cargo aircrafts to land and in 
turn provides Ecuadorian goods greater access to world markets.159  
Quiport also supports the goal of transforming Quito into a South 
American commerce center,160 including plans of routing cargo between 
Quito and Chicago.161 In 2012, the World Bank reported that Latin 
America had a very small market share of global air traffic,162 with only 
four airports in the top one hundred, and that the new Mariscal Sucre was 
the only international airport being built in South America at the time.163 
To capitalize on the dearth of competitors, however, the new airport had 
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to be able to facilitate traffic and cargo from other areas in South 
America.164 To accommodate such a large project, designers had to 
develop supporting infrastructure, including a new six-lane highway.165 
Additional plans have been made to develop the infrastructure 
connecting the different airports around the country.166 The new airport 
project evolved beyond its original safety focus and became a gateway to 
Ecuador’s economic development and South America’s connection to the 
global economy.167  
 
B. Project & Financial Structure 
Quiport is a joint venture with Canada’s Aecon Construction Group 
and Brazil’s Andrade Gutierrez as some of the main sponsors.168 These 
companies joined together to develop the airport and supporting 
infrastructure, which cost roughly USD $700 million after the initial 
estimate of USD $586 million.169 Quiport employed many different 
avenues to pay for the project including debt, equity, and net cash flows 
from the operation.170 The lenders include Corporación Aeropuerto y 
Zona Franca del Distrito Metropolitano de Quito (“CORPAQ”), 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”), Export-Import Bank 
of the United States of America (“EXIM”), the InterAmerican 
Development Bank (“IADB”), and Canada’s Export Development 
Corporation (EDC).171 OPIC alone committed to provide up to USD 
$200 million in financing.172  
In conformity with the project finance model, the set of contracts 
divided the responsibilities, expectations, and rewards into a concession 
agreement for thirty-five years.173 Quiport had a finance agreement with 
OPIC, a credit agreement with EXIM, loan agreements with IDB and 
EDC, and a master security accounts agreement.174 The currency control 
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is an example of Quiport sponsors thoroughly addressing as many 
foreseeable risks as possible, especially considering that the sponsors 
already had a protection against inflation with Ecuador currently using 
the U.S. dollar as its currency.175 
As the project progressed, the most significant provisions became 
those associated with expected cash flows.176 The expected cash flows 
derived from projections about the traffic, all fees (both commercial and 
regulated), and other operating costs.177 Quiport contracted to manage the 
airport and pay the city of Quito eleven percent of the regulated 
revenues, which include airline landing fees and passenger departure 
fees.178 These fees later became the basis for dispute.179    
 
C.  Risks Defined & Realized 
Although Quiport sponsors pursued strong organizational and 
financial structures through contracts, the project still faced the risks of 
political protests and delays.180 These risks materialized in 2010 when an 
armed group, protesting salary issues, took control of the airport and 
compelled it to shut down.181 In addition to the risk of delays and protest, 
Quiport investors also had to overcome a populist constitutional 
challenge to the distribution of income from airport fees, which emerged 
after the project was underway.182 
Ecuador demanded that the investors comply with the country’s new 
constitution regardless of their contract’s express provisions.183 The 
General Comptroller classified the airport’s service fees as taxes and 
claimed that they were not subject to a private entity’s control.184 In 
agreement, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court declared the Quiport 
concession agreement unconstitutional.185 In its holding, the court 
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evaluated the lending arrangement186 and determined that the fees were 
in fact taxes and therefore could not be the responsibility of a private 
entity, like Quiport, to administer.187  
The constitutional challenge appeared to be a political maneuver to 
exact greater profit for the government by renegotiating the contract after 
the deal had already closed.188 The government argued that the new 
Constitution, which was not in effect at the time Quiport entered into the 
contracts or began the project, could alter the agreement.189 The 
Constitutional Court further held that Quiport violated Article 
CCLXXXVII of the 2008 Constitution, which requires that only public 
bodies can receive and utilize funds from public resources.190 Under the 
concession agreement, regulated revenues (i.e., airline landing fees, 
passenger departure fees, etc.) were to be distributed between parties; the 
city of Quito would receive eleven percent and Quiport would keep the 
remaining eighty-nine percent.191 These fees could be substantial if 
Ecuador were to achieve its goal of becoming a regional hub for South 
America.192 Rather than adhering to the contract or even engaging 
Quiport in a discussion on the distribution of these revenues, the new 
government simply declared that that these fees were public resources 
that only the state could administer.193 The Constitutional Court agreed, 
declaring that the fees were a public resource because they were the type 
of funds that only a public institution could administer.194   
The Constitutional Court attempted to legitimize its decision, not 
through reason, but through enumerating procedural constitutional 
provisions.195 A large portion of the opinion was a justification of the 
court’s authority to find Quiport in violation of the Constitution.196 The 
procedural provisions cited by the Court created a gloss of authority for 
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what was otherwise a retroactive attempt to extort more money, 
estimated to be at least USD $200 million, out of the project.197   
 
D.  Resolution of Risks 
Despite the added expenses and costly eighteen-month delay caused 
by the government’s attempt to alter the airport deal,198 Quiport sponsors 
archetypically resolved the dispute.199 This resolution occurred,200 in 
large part, because the stabilization clause in the contract provided for 
arbitration at the World Bank and an option for recourse through BITs 
between Canada and Ecuador.201 Based on the stabilization clause, the 
parties reached a settlement in 2011.202  
While Quiport resolved some of the largest risks, the success of the 
project remains in debate.203 Only a few months after its inauguration, 
people criticized the airport for its distance from the city, quirks in the 
flight schedules, lack of accommodations for travelers, and the 
surrounding mountain roads to which many foreigners were 
unaccustomed.204 The Economist criticized the new airport for having 
simply shifted the problems of the old airport, rather than solving them, 
by saying, “[n]ow, the discomfort is on the ground.”205 The criticism may 
have been due to the fact that the airport’s roads were still under 
construction during the opening.206 Furthermore, a few months of 
observation likely does not provide much insight into the long-term 
success of the project.207 Regardless of the initial complaints, however, 
Quiport demonstrates the types of risks investors in Ecuador may expect 
to encounter and how to resolve those risks using project finance and 
stabilization clauses.208 
 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PROJECT FINANCERS: STRONG 
STABILIZATION CLAUSES 
 
Ecuador’s populist trend poses a significant risk to all investors in the 
region, but project financiers are in a position to minimize the risk by 
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negotiating for strong contracts that include a stabilization clause like the 
one in Quiport’s agreement.209 Stabilization clauses protect investors 
because the clauses allow investors “to control the future.”210 
Stabilization clauses do this by shielding investors through international 
and domestic enforcement as well as by providing a basis for insurance 
recovery.211 Quiport’s stabilization clause was a significant reason why 
the settlement and renegotiation of the airport was so successful.212  
Stabilization clauses come in a variety of flavors: “freezing,” 
“economic equilibrium,” and “hybrid.”213 Freezing clauses prevent any 
changes in the laws that were not in place at the time of contracting from 
affecting the project.214 Equilibrium clauses simply provide for the host 
nation to compensate the investors for any costs resulting from the 
application of changes in the law.215 A hybrid clause combines the 
freezing and equilibrium approaches.216 The clauses can be narrow, such 
as controlling specific taxes, or broader, such as covering all laws.217 
These clauses alleviate the tension between a sovereign’s desire to 
govern without foreign influence and an investors’ need for protection.218  
Ecuador’s opting out of ICSID and BITs has limited the traditional 
enforcement of stabilization clauses;219 however, these limitations do not 
entirely negate stabilization clauses as a significant protection.220  
Stabilization clauses can also be effective if the concession agreement 
somehow “internationalize[s]” itself.221 For example, investors may still 
conceivably enforce their contracts under international law through a 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
arbitration or through the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce.222  
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In addition to international enforcement mechanisms, parties also 
have the option to enforce stabilization clauses domestically.223 Domestic 
law, however, is most often used as a compliment to other protections in 
a contract.224  
Should international and domestic enforcement of stabilization 
clauses fail to protect the investor, the stabilization clause could support 
an insurance claim for damages.225 Project insurance can cover both the 
risks from expropriation of property as well as breaches of contractual 
provisions.226 Insurance protection is important because if the host 
country breaches a stabilization clause, the insurance company may 
cover the investor’s losses depending upon the terms of the insurance 
provisions.227 While insurance raises the aggregate transaction costs,228 
savvy investors can structure the deal to pass insurance costs on to the 
contracting nation and its agencies.229  
In summary, stabilization clauses, such as the one that Quiport 
employed, are still strong protection for investors. In populist nations 
stabilization clauses provide the investor with predictable laws or 
compensation that is enforceable through limited international and 
domestic frameworks.230 Moreover, even if those frameworks fail, 
investors can recover their damages through insurance with the support 
of a stabilization clause.231   
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Quiport revealed that investing in Ecuador and other populist nations 
is feasible, even in light of the challenges populism poses.232 When the 
Quiport sponsors encountered a constitutional challenge to its fee 
distribution arrangement, they successfully relied on strong contractual 
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provisions including a stabilization clause.233 The stabilization clause 
enabled the Quiport sponsors to arbitrate the dispute at ICSID and reach 
a settlement with the government of Ecuador.234 Although ICSID will no 
longer be available, stabilization clauses remain a valuable protection for 
future investors in Ecuador because other international and domestic 
enforcement mechanisms are still available.235 Even if those features 
prove unreliable, a stabilization clause, coupled with the purchase of 
insurance, could establish damages for an insurance payment in the case 
of any change in law or constitution.236  
As a result of a stabilization clause, Quiport investors made a 
potentially successful investment in Ecuador. Although foreign investors 
face an even more populist government in Ecuador now, project finance 
can still avoid the risks of populism.237 Through the use of a stabilization 
clause, investors can approach safer investment opportunities in populist 
countries, like Ecuador, just as pilots can now approach safer landings at 
the new Quito airport.238  
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